{“lastseen”:”2026-06-15T20:26:02″,”description”:”During our recent threat hunting activities, we found EtherRAT malware being distributed by a website with a strange homepage. This homepage allowed us to discover a vast malicious infrastructure distributing malware, malicious documents, remote desktop software, and phishing pages. \\n\\nEtherRAT is a RAT developed in Node.js which allows an attacker to gain complete control over the machine and execute arbitrary code returned by the Command and Control (C2) server. The malware uses the Etherium blockchain to obtain the C2 server, hence the \\”Ether\\” part of the name. EtherRAT is typically distributed via MSI, PowerShell, or JavaScript scripts. \\n\\n## An open directory that distributes EtherRAT: where it all began \\n\\nWhile threat hunting, we found an open directory that was distributing MSI installers and PowerShell scripts, which ultimately distributed EtherRAT. In the analyzed cases, the PowerShell scripts and MSI installers were distributed from a \u201c\/install\u201d folder. The versions have a progressive number, ranging from v1 to v10. \\n\\n_Open Directory hosting EtherRAT MSI _\\n\\nThe returned home page caught our attention and prompted us to further explore the campaign. \\n\\n_The homepage returned by the EtherRAT distribution website_ \\n\\nAnalyzing domains and associated IPs with the EtherRAT distribution, we detected other similar home pages with a hacking-style theme. They appeared to belong to a larger distribution chain, which also distributes phishing, remote control software, and other malware. These websites usually have several folders with malware and phishing related content, and what is displayed depends on the specific infection chain. \\n\\nDifferent websites that resolve to the same IP addresses have previously returned pages related to fake companies or default templates. The use of these new pages could therefore be a method to make detection more difficult for automated scanners or researchers. Here are some of the home pages we found:\\n\\n_Some of the malicious websites indexed on Google_ \\n\\nEtherRAT is an interesting RAT, as it has few lines of code and allows the execution of arbitrary code returned by the C2 server. Furthermore, using the Ethereum blockchain to obtain the C2 server makes it more resilient to infrastructure takedowns. \\n\\n# Technical analysis of EtherRAT \\n\\nThe detected websites usually distribute an MSI or PowerShell script with the version name, such as v1.msi, v2.ps1, and so on. \\n\\n## MSI Loader \\n\\nThe MSI file \\”v9.msi\\” contains three components: \\n\\n**MSI Filename** | **Description** \\n—|— \\nKmPuGimn.cmd | BAT launcher \\ncDQMlQAru0.xml | First Jscript loader \\nMRaQCipBIZeiZNx.log | Encrypted EtherRAT \\n \\nWhen the MSI is executed, the \u201cKmPuGimn.cmd\u201d file is started: \\n \\n \\n conhost –headless cmd \/c \\”KmPuGimn.cmd\\” \\n\\nThis obfuscated BAT file performs different operations: \\n\\n * Extracts the other files in a random folder in %LOCALAPPDATA%. \\n * Re-executes itself via: \\n * %SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\conhost.exe -headless %SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe \/c call \\”C:\\\\Users\\\\\\\\{user}\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\\\\\{random_path}\\\\KmPuGimn.cmd\\” nKWa \\n * Runs the command \u201cwhere node\u201d to find an existing installation. \\n * Downloads Node.js if it\u2019s not found \\n * Uses \\”curl -sLo\\” to download Node.js from the official website. \\n * Extracts to installation directory via \\”tar -xf\\”. \\n * Renames extracted directory to \\”28Q75h\\”.\\n * Loops until both \\”MRaQCipBIZeiZNx.log\\” and \\”cDQMlQAru0.xml\\” exist, then executes: \\n * conhost.exe -headless C:\\\\Users\\\\\\\\{user}\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\\\\\{random_path}\\\\\\\\{random_path}\\\\node.exe cDQMlQAru0.xml \\n\\n\\n\\nThe executed \\”cDQMlQAru0.xml\\” is a loader that decrypts the embedded code with a XOR function and then executes it with \\”vm.compileFunction\\”. \\n \\n \\n decrypted[i] = (encrypted[i] – key[i % key.length] – i) \\u0026 0xFF \\n\\n_The embedded decrypted code_ \\n\\nThe decrypted code: \\n\\n * Copies node.exe in \\”C:\\\\Users\\\\\\\\{user}\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\\\\\{random_path}\\\\\\\\{random_path}\\\\\\\\_MJlLlt5.exe\\”. \\n * Adds a registry key for persistence with \\”conhost.exe \u2013headless\\”. \\n * Decrypts \\”MRaQCipBIZeiZNx.log\\” and executes it with \\”_MJlLlt5.exe\\” stdin. \\n\\n\\n\\nThe decryption algorithm is a custom stream-like decoding routing based on XOR, byte rotations and an accumulator: \\n \\n \\n for e in range(len(data)): \\n byte = data[e] \\n g = prev \\n prev = byte \\n byte = (byte – g) \\u0026 0xff \\n byte = byte ^ n[e % len(n)] ^ ((e \\u003e\\u003e 8) \\u0026 0xff) \\n byte = si[byte] \\n byte = (byte – k[e % len(k)]) \\u0026 0xff\\n result[e] = byte \\n\\nThe final stage is to deploy EtherRAT. EtherRAT allows the attacker to: \\n\\n * Execute arbitrary JavaScript code received by the C2 server. This allows the attacker to execute new commands, perform operations on files and folders, modify the registry, and exfiltrate data. \\n * Get a new C2 server using the Ethereum blockchain. \\n * Reobfuscate itself. \\n * Save the logs to \\”svchost.log\\”. \\n\\n_Part of decrypted EtherRAT code_ \\n\\nThe EtherRAT uses Ethereum’s \\”eth_call\\” JSON-RPC method to retrieve the active C2 URL from a smart contract on the Ethereum mainnet. \\n\\nThe blockchain parameters in this case are: \\n\\n * Contract: 0x88ea8d0bc4146f0a018e989df3fd089ac48f9a58 \\n * Function selector: 0x7d434425 \\n * Argument: 0xf6a772e163e64b07f658946f863b5d457d88f9f0 \\n\\n_The decoded C2 from Ethereum blockchain_ \\n\\nThe contacted URLs to obtain the C2 server endpoint are: \\n\\n * mainnet[.]gateway[.]tenderly[.]co \\n * rpc[.]flashbots[.]net\/fast \\n * rpc[.]mevblocker[.]io \\n * eth-mainnet[.]public[.]blastapi[.]io \\n * ethereum-rpc[.]publicnode[.]com \\n * eth[.]drpc[.]org \\n * eth[.]merkle[.]io \\n\\n\\n\\nPolling requests use randomized URL patterns based on some parameters defined in the code: \\n \\n \\n GET \/api\/\\u003c4-byte-hex\\u003e\/\\u003cvictim-uuid\\u003e\/\\u003c4-byte-hex\\u003e.\\u003cext\\u003e?\\u003cparam\\u003e=\\u003cbuild-id\\u003e \\n X-Bot-Server: \\u003cc2_url\\u003e \\n\\nIn the analyzed sample, the parameters are: \\n\\n * Build ID: \\”6f816d80-0d6c-4384-9cd6-6b79965fc08f\\” \\n * ext: randomly selected from \\”png\\”, \\”jpg\\”, \\”gif\\”, \\”css\\”, \\”ico\\”, \\”webp\\”. \\n * param: randomly selected from \\”id\\”, \\”token\\”, \\”key\\”, \\”b\\”, \\”q\\”, \\”s\\”, \\”v\\”. \\n\\n\\n\\nAfter startup, the RAT sends its own source code to the C2 server. The C2 responds with a newly obfuscated version of the script, which is written back to disk, making each execution generate a new file hash. \\n \\n \\n POST \/api\/[REOBF_PATH]\/\\u003cvictim-uuid\\u003e \\n Body: { \\”code\\”: \\”\\u003ccurrent_script_contents\\u003e\\”, \\”build\\”: \\”\\u003cbuild_id\\u003e\\” } \\n\\nAfter the EtherRAT execution, we observed different post-compromised cmd.exe activities to check the environment. For example: \\n\\n * powershell -NoProfile -NonInteractive -WindowStyle Hidden -Command \\”(Get-WmiObject Win32_VideoController).Name\\”\\n * reg query \\”HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\” \/v MachineGuid \\n * powershell -NoProfile -NonInteractive -WindowStyle Hidden -Command \\”(Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).Domain\\” \\n * powershell -NoProfile -NonInteractive -WindowStyle Hidden -Command \\”(Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain\\” \\n * cmd.exe \/d \/s \/c \\”net session\\” \\n\\n_EtherRAT logs_ \\n\\n### PowerShell Loader \\n\\nThe activities performed by the PowerShell loaders are very similar to the last stage of the JS script of the MSI installer: \\n\\n * Downloads Node.js if it\u2019s not present. \\n * Create the necessary directories. \\n * Decode the EtherRAT with a custom decryption algorithm. \\n * Execute Node.js with conhost.exe and the decrypted EtherRAT payload. \\n\\n\\n\\nWe detected some variants of the PowerShell loader hosted on these websites; namely that the functions’ names and the decryption functions change in the analyzed PowerShell scripts. \\n\\n_The decryption of EtherRAT payload with the custom decryption algorithm_ \\n\\n# Tracking the malicious infrastructure \\n\\nWhen we analyzed the different websites with the \\”hacking-theme\\” pages, we found that in the past many had hosted multiple phishing pages in some specific paths. For example: \\n\\n * \/zht\/sharep-redirect.html \\n * \/bl\/me.php \\n * \/t\/teams \\n * \/teams\/Windows\/invite.php \\n\\n\\n\\nIt seems that these domains and IPs are actually part of a much larger infrastructure that distributes malware, phishing, malicious documents, and remote software. It is possible that these infrastructures are shared by multiple threat actors who activate different URL endpoints based on the specific campaign. \\n\\nInterestingly, the majority of the domains related to this malicious infrastructure in the past also returned an HTML page related to a \\”Bulletproof Infrastructure\\” service. \\n\\nWe found that these phishing campaigns typically start via emails with documents attached, such as PDF or Excel files. These documents ask the user to click a link to view another document. Below are two examples of the phishing documents attached to the emails:\\n\\nThese phishing pages typically ask the user to enter their email address, then continue the infection chain and distribute phishing or malware pages. Below are some of the phishing pages detected within the malicious infrastructure:\\n\\n## Misconfigurations exposed the phishing kits \\n\\nWhile tracking malicious websites, we found one with an open directory containing part of the phishing kit used in the campaigns. \\n\\n_Open directory hosting part of phishing kits_\\n\\n \\n\\nThe open directory contained several folders with code and pages related to the phishing campaigns. \\n\\n_Phishing kit code_ \\n\\nAdditionally, some domains were misconfigured and allowed the download of \\”cl.zip\\”, which contained the source code for the \\”URL Cloaker\\” pages. \\n\\n_Part of \\”URL Cloaker\\” code_ \\n\\n## **Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)** \\n\\n### **IPs** \\n\\n82[.]165[.]65[.]244: malicious infrastructure \\n\\n185[.]221[.]216[.]121: malicious infrastructure \\n\\n43[.]163[.]233[.]166: malicious infrastructure \\n\\n40[.]160[.]238[.]30: malicious infrastructure \\n\\n159[.]89[.]227[.]204: malicious infrastructure \\n\\n57[.]128[.]31[.]168: malicious infrastructure \\n\\n### **Domains** \\n\\nivorilla[.]cloud: EtherRAT distribution \\n\\nmx[.]nrlwz[.]com: EtherRAT distribution \\n\\ndn[.]eyqwj[.]com: EtherRAT distribution \\n\\nbi[.]mkrjcsw[.]com: EtherRAT distribution \\n\\ndorqen[.]casa: EtherRAT distribution \\n\\nkelvra[.]club: EtherRAT distribution \\n\\ncambioefectivo[.]com: EtherRAT C2 \\n\\nvabelles[.]com: EtherRAT C2 \\n\\ntranzed[.]org: EtherRAT C2 \\n\\nkibrisarazi[.]com: EtherRAT C2 \\n\\naravisblog[.]com: EtherRAT C2 \\n\\npublicspeakingtip[.]org: EtherRAT C2 \\n\\n## **Acknowledgement****s****** \\n\\n * EtherRAT: https:\/\/atos.net\/en\/lp\/cybershield\/etherrat-distribution-spoofing-administrative-tools-via-github-facades \\n\\n\\n * SharePoint reference: https:\/\/ironscales.com\/threat-intelligence\/no-macro-xlsx-shared-strings-aitm-redirect-credential-harvest \\n\\n\\n\\n* * *\\n\\n**Stop threats before they can do any harm.**\\n\\nMalwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing pages and malicious sites automatically. Free, one click to install. Add it to your browser \u2192”,”published”:”2026-06-15T20:17:46″,”modified”:”2026-06-15T20:17:46″,”type”:”malwarebytes”,”title”:”Inside a\u00a0malicious infrastructure delivering\u00a0EtherRAT,\u00a0phishing pages,\u00a0and malicious software”,”source”:””,”references”:””,”id”:”MALWAREBYTES:FCB122BA82E07977E3F393F732A03DA2″,”bulletinFamily”:”blog”,”cwe”:null,”cvelist”:[],”sourceData”:””,”sourceHref”:””,”cvss”:{“score”:0,”severity”:”NONE”,”vector”:”NONE”,”version”:”NONE”},”cvss2″:{},”cvss3″:{“version”:””,”vectorString”:””,”baseScore”:0,”baseSeverity”:””,”attackVector”:””,”attackComplexity”:””,”privilegesRequired”:””,”userInteraction”:””,”scope”:””,”confidentialityImpact”:””,”integrityImpact”:””,”availabilityImpact”:””,”cvssV3″:{“version”:””,”vectorString”:””,”baseScore”:0,”baseSeverity”:””,”attackVector”:””,”attackComplexity”:””,”privilegesRequired”:””,”userInteraction”:””,”scope”:””,”confidentialityImpact”:””,”integrityImpact”:””,”availabilityImpact”:””}},”href”:”https:\/\/www.malwarebytes.com\/blog\/threat-intel\/2026\/06\/inside-a-malicious-infrastructure-delivering-etherrat-phishing-pages-and-malicious-software”,”category_name”:”News”,”post_link”:””,”product”:””,”version”:””,”vendor”:””,”ai_description”:””,”ai_severity”:””,”ai_vendor”:””,”ai_product”:””,”ai_version”:””,”ai_score”:0}<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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