{“lastseen”:”2026-06-22T11:36:50″,”description”:”\\n\\nIn June 2026, we observed a malware campaign distributing malicious VBScript files through direct messages in WhatsApp. The campaign affected users across multiple countries and territories, including Malaysia, Brazil, India, Mexico, Singapore, UK, Spain, Taiwan, Australia, Russia and Vietnam, with the highest number of victims observed in Malaysia. At the time of writing this article, the campaign is still active.\\n\\nAnalysis shows that the campaign primarily targets users of WhatsApp Desktop and WhatsApp Web. The threat actor uses deceptive file names masquerading as business and financial documents to persuade recipients to download and execute the attachment. Once executed, the VBScript initiates a multi-stage infection chain that ultimately results in the installation of legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software, enabling remote access to the victim’s system.\\n\\n\\n\\nOverview of the WhatsApp-based VBScript infection chain\\n\\nWe came across a number of social media posts reporting that the malware was being distributed by the users’ contacts. The messages contained only the malicious attachment and did not include any accompanying text. One account sent the same attachment to multiple contacts from their list.\\n\\n\\n\\nWhatsApp messages containing the malicious VBScript file observed across multiple accounts. Source: alleged victims’ posts on social media\\n\\nBased on evidence collected from multiple victims through social media reports and submitted samples, we can conclude that the threat actor had gained access to several WhatsApp accounts and used them to distribute the malicious VBScript files to contacts on the compromised users’ contact lists. At the time of writing, the exact method used to compromise these WhatsApp accounts remains unknown.\\n\\n## Social engineering through financial-themed file names\\n\\nAnalysis of the samples revealed that the threat actor relied heavily on social engineering through the use of deceptive file names designed to appear as legitimate business and financial documents. The file names frequently referenced invoices, account statements, debt notices, payment records, and bank statements. \\nExamples of file names include:\\n\\n * Financial Reports.vbs\\n * Debt confirmation.vbs\\n * Statement of Debt(30K).vbs\\n * Outstanding Payment List.vbs\\n * Account Statement.vbs\\n * Debt Statement.vbs\\n * Billing Statement (2).vbs\\n * Promissory_Note(b).vbs\\n\\n\\n\\nSeveral file names were also localized into different languages, including Portuguese, French, German, and Malay. Examples include:\\n\\n * Extrato de Concilia\u00e7\u00e3o.vbs\\n * Aviso de d\u00edvida.vbs\\n * Le formulaire de demande le plus r\u00e9cent.vbs\\n * Bitte f\u00fcllen Sie das Formular f\u00fcr Umsatzsteuer-Nullsatz-Verk\u00e4ufe aus.vbs\\n * Penyata bank.vbs\\n * Sila semak bil anda.vbs\\n\\n\\n\\nThe use of multiple languages further suggests that the campaign may be targeting victims across different geographic regions.\\n\\nIn addition, the VBScript samples contain extensive comments and metadata intended to mimic legitimate Microsoft Windows Update components. Many of these comments are written in Chinese and include references to Windows Update modules, certificate validation, system integrity checks, and deployment-related functionality. The screenshot below shows an example of the Windows Update\u2013themed comments and Chinese-language annotations embedded within one of the analyzed scripts.\\n\\n\\n\\nWindows Update\u2013themed and Chinese-language comments observed across multiple Stage 1 VBScript variants\\n\\n### Delivery of the initial VBScript file\\n\\nAnalysis of telemetry collected from the systems where the malware was executed, conducted together with the dynamic analysis of the sample, showed that the VBScript is launched through Windows Script Host (WScript.exe), which subsequently retrieves and executes additional VBScript components required for the later stages of the attack.\\n\\nTwo user interactions are needed to initiate the infection chain. When the user first clicks the attachment in either WhatsApp Desktop or WhatsApp web, it is downloaded to their machine. To launch the app, they need to open it.\\n\\nIn WhatsApp Desktop, the malware is executed directly within the application by clicking once more the file icon or by choosing the option \\”Open\\” in the chat. The process tree analysis shows that WScript.exe is spawned by WhatsApp.Root.exe. The executed script was observed within WhatsApp Desktop’s attachment storage directory, with the following command line:\\n \\n \\n \\”C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WScript.exe\\” \\”C:\\\\Users\\\\\\u003cusername\\u003e\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Packages\\\\5319275A.WhatsAppDesktop_cv1g1gvanyjgm\\\\LocalState\\\\Sessions\\\\\\u003csession_identifier\\u003e\\\\Transfers\\\\\\u003cYYYY-MM\\u003e\\\\financial reports(s).vbs\\”\\n\\nThis process relationship confirms that the malicious VBScript was executed directly from the WhatsApp Desktop client.\\n\\nIn contrast, when the attachment is accessed through WhatsApp Web, to launch the malware, the user should open the downloaded file from the Downloads folder or through the browser’s download history. In the first case, the malware’s parent process will be explorer.exe, while in the second, it will be executed by the browser where the web app was opened.\\n\\n## Technical analysis\\n\\n### Stage 1: Initial VBScript execution\\n\\nThe first stage of the infection chain is a VBS or VBE file delivered through WhatsApp. Although multiple variants of the scripts were observed, their core functionality remains consistent: the script creates a working directory under `C:\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\Documents\\\\`, downloads two additional VBScript payloads from a remote infrastructure, and executes them using Windows Script Host.\\n\\nAcross the observed variants, the working directory is created using randomized names such as `Temp_\\u003crandom\\u003e` or `MSUpdate_\\u003crandom\\u003e`. Some variants also configure the directory and downloaded files with hidden and system attributes, likely to reduce visibility to the user during execution.\\n\\n\\n\\nExample of the code generating a random working directory and configuring it with hidden and system attributes\\n\\nThe scripts employ several obfuscation techniques, including string concatenation, encoded VBScript, randomized variable names, and large amounts of junk content. One notable variant employs even heavier obfuscation than the other samples. The script reconstructs object names, file paths, utilities, and URLs through character-by-character string concatenation.\\n\\n\\n\\nExample of an obfuscated Stage 1 VBScript variant.\\n\\nSeveral variants copy curl.exe and bitsadmin.exe into the working directory and rename them using DLL-like filenames before downloading additional VBS files.\\n\\n\\n\\nExample of the Stage 1 downloader logic using renamed Windows utilities and multiple download mechanisms to retrieve additional VBS files\\n\\nThe downloaded files are commonly staged using misleading file extensions before execution. For example, some variants download files using PDF or TXT extensions and then change them to VBS before launching them with wscript.exe. Other variants download the secondary VBScript payloads directly.\\n\\nDespite differences in infrastructure, file names, and obfuscation methods, all observed variants ultimately perform the same function: downloading and executing two secondary VBScript payloads that continue the infection chain.\\n\\n## Stage 2: Execution of secondary VBScript payloads\\n\\nFollowing execution, the Stage 1 VBScript downloads and launches two additional VBScript files from attacker-controlled infrastructure. One script attempts to modify Windows User Account Control (UAC) settings, while the other downloads and executes a ZIP archive containing the installation package for a RMM software.\\n\\n### VBS script 1: UAC configuration modification\\n\\nFirst Stage 2 scripts were observed attempting to modify Windows UAC behavior.\\n\\n\\n\\nStage 2 VBScript repeatedly attempting to modify the ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin registry value\\n\\nAs shown in the figure above, the script repeatedly executes an elevated registry modification command targeting the following registry key:\\n \\n \\n HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin\\n\\nThe command is launched using the `ShellExecute` method with the `runas` verb, causing Windows to request administrative privileges before the registry change can be applied. Its goal is to set the `ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin` registry key value to 0, thus enabling administrative actions without displaying a consent prompt to the user. The script attempts to apply this registry change in a loop with short delays between executions, likely to increase the chances that the setting will be successfully modified if administrative privileges are granted by the victim.\\n\\n### VBS script 2: ZIP download and script execution\\n\\nThe second VBS script downloads a ZIP file, extracts it and executes a script to start the RMM installation.\\n\\nSimilar to the Stage 1 downloader, the Stage 2 downloader creates its own working directory under `C:\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\Documents\\\\`, commonly using randomized folder names such as `Sys\\u003crandom\\u003e`, `Data\\u003crandom\\u003e`, or a random numeric value. In most cases, the hidden attribute is assigned to this folder. The script then downloads a ZIP archive from attacker-controlled infrastructure, extracts its contents, and executes an embedded setup1.vbs script.\\n\\n\\n\\nStage 2 downloader creating a hidden working directory under C:\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\Documents\\\\\\n\\nSimilar to the Stage 1 downloader, the variants leverage multiple download mechanisms, including curl, bitsadmin, certutil, PowerShell, and direct HTTP requests.\\n\\n\\n\\nStage 2 downloader using multiple download mechanisms to retrieve the ZIP archive\\n\\nFollowing a successful download, the archive is extracted using the Shell.Application COM interface. Most variants invoke the CopyHere method with flags intended to suppress user prompts and allow extraction to proceed without user interaction. The extracted setup1.vbs script is then launched through wscript.exe to proceed with the next stage of the infection chain.\\n\\nAlso, one variant additionally attempts to remove `Zone.Identifier` alternate data streams from extracted files prior to execution, likely to reduce security warnings associated with files downloaded from the Internet.\\n\\n\\n\\nExample of the code responsible for ZIP extraction, Zone.Identifier removal, and execution of the next-stage VBScript\\n\\n## Stage 3: Installation of remote monitoring and management software\\n\\nBesides the setup1.vbs script, the ZIP archive downloaded during Stage 2 contains a preconfigured ManageEngine Endpoint Central deployment package. Inside the archive are the files required to install and register the Endpoint Central agent, including the MSI installer, configuration files, certificates, and installation scripts.\\n\\n\\n\\nExtracted Stage 3 Endpoint Central installation ZIP package\\n\\nThe table below summarizes the purpose of each file contained within the deployment package:\\n\\n**File** | **Description** \\n—|— \\nDCAgentServerInfo.json | Endpoint Central server configuration containing management server IP addresses and ports \\nDMRootCA.crt | Trusted root certificate \\nDMRootCA-Server.crt | Server authentication certificate \\nREADME.html | Endpoint Central agent setup instructions \\nsetup.bat | Legitimate Endpoint Central installer wrapper included in the package, not used by the malware chain \\nsetup1.vbs | Malicious launcher used by the threat actor to silently install the Endpoint Central agent \\nUEMSAgent.msi | Endpoint Central agent installer package \\nUEMSAgent.mst | Custom installation configuration settings for the MSI package \\n \\nManageEngine Endpoint Central is a legitimate enterprise management platform commonly used for software deployment, system administration, and remote support. Its remote administration capabilities make it attractive for abuse by threat actors seeking persistent access to compromised systems.\\n\\nOne interesting variant attempted to disguise the package as an income tax\u2013related document. Instead of containing a legitimate tax document, the archive contained a VBScript file named \\”Income Tax Return Form.vbs\\” and accompanied by an instruction file designed to persuade the victim to open it. Analysis showed that the VBScript contained functionality similar to setup1.vbs, ultimately performing the same Endpoint Central installation process.\\n\\n\\n\\nTax document-themed VBScript lure and installation script\\n\\nAs discussed in Stage 2, the downloader ultimately executes a VBScript file named setup1.vbs. The script first verifies that the required installation files are present in the extracted folder and then attempts to relaunch itself with administrative privileges using the Windows runas mechanism before proceeding with the installation.\\n\\n\\n\\nThe setup1.vbs script verifying installation files and requesting administrative privileges\\n\\nOnce elevated, setup1.vbs silently installs the bundled ManageEngine Endpoint Central agent using msiexec.exe, applying the supplied configuration and certificate files. The installation is performed silently, preventing the user from seeing the Endpoint Central installation interface.\\n\\n\\n\\nEndpoint Central agent installation via msiexec.exe\\n\\nAnalysis of the embedded DCAgentServerInfo.json configuration file revealed the following Endpoint Central management servers:\\n\\n * 202.61.160[.]208\\n * 202.61.160[.]202\\n * 202.61.160[.]201\\n * 202.61.160[.]160\\n * 202.61.160[.]137\\n * 38.55.151[.]63\\n\\n\\n\\nNotably, 202.61.160[.]201 had previously been observed as command-and-control infrastructure associated with ValleyRAT and Gh0st RAT activity. Although the overlap raises the possibility of the VBS campaign being linked to the operator of these known malware families, the available evidence is insufficient to confidently attribute the campaign to a known threat actor.\\n\\n## Victimology and attribution\\n\\nBased on our telemetry, infections were observed across several countries and territories, including Malaysia, Brazil, India, Mexico, Singapore, UK, Spain, Taiwan, Australia, Russia, and Vietnam, with 80% of the victims located in Malaysia. The campaign primarily relied on malicious VBScript attachments distributed through WhatsApp and appeared to target individual users rather than specific organizations or industries. At the time of the analysis, no evidence suggested a focused targeting strategy, instead indicating a broad, opportunistic campaign aimed at consumers.\\n\\nWe were unable to confidently attribute this activity to a known threat actor or intrusion set. However, several artifacts observed throughout the campaign point to a possible Chinese-speaking threat actor.\\n\\nMultiple VBScript samples contained comments, module descriptions, and execution notes written in simplified Chinese characters. These comments appeared consistently across different variants, suggesting that the scripts were likely developed or maintained by a Chinese-speaking operator.\\n\\nWe also identified infrastructure overlaps with IP addresses previously associated with ValleyRAT and Gh0st RAT activity. While these overlaps may indicate infrastructure reuse or shared hosting resources, they are not sufficient to establish a direct connection to any known threat actor.\\n\\nBased on the available evidence, we assess with low confidence that the campaign was conducted by a Chinese-speaking operator. Additional investigation, infrastructure overlaps, or operational indicators would be required to support a stronger attribution assessment.\\n\\n## Conclusion\\n\\nThis campaign uses compromised WhatsApp accounts to distribute malicious VBScript attachments that ultimately install a preconfigured ManageEngine Endpoint Central agent on victim systems. Observed victims were located across multiple countries and territories, including Malaysia, Brazil, India, Mexico, Singapore, UK, Spain, Taiwan, Australia, Russia, and Vietnam, suggesting a broad and opportunistic campaign. Users should be cautious when receiving unexpected attachments through WhatsApp, even when they appear to originate from known contacts. Script and executable file types such as VBS, VBE, EXE, BAT, CMD, JS, and PS1 should not be opened unless their legitimacy has been independently verified.\\n\\n## IOCs\\n\\n### VBScript\\n\\nc7f38cbb99c8b74fa0465293feeba700 Financial Reports.vbs \\nb7cd06c71465038b658a6dc1f273a507 Debt confirmation.vbs \\n9f13c7b8ba391b2f597874e54d310648 Electronic statement(A).vbs \\n993f4c0cadbc769a4b0ed62a918db58d Financial Reports(s).vbs \\n7f81c1bc8cfd588e8998968e2621456e Outstanding Payment List.vbs \\n7403cbcc5a9c32384d431856dc48fcc9 Statement of debt (4).vbs \\n68c16c46f8afb9e00bbaba0207fb0a46 Debt Note (2).vbs \\n66442f2457eca8f47385b1fb2c6fcab8 Statement of Debt(30K).vbs \\n6359e6236471cbe434d0ef4c42b7f879 Applicationform1.vbs \\n5b6bbcc06cf08cc99e1afeda486d42fb Extrato de Concilia\u00e7\u00e3o.vbs \\n5002eca748205d544618e3bd2dedc223 Statement of Debt(29K).vbs \\n4f0593e8e0e8fac49429e9b45ebf7fa1 Outstanding Payment List.vbs \\n4044e4b6471c9de7b0a4ba37d9d9df9a billing statement (2).vbs \\n20209b3a32769afc6a75694b8d8839dd Statement of Debt(A).vbs \\n0ba93109757776a44de9d8c88baa4963 Financial Reports(C1).vbs \\n02bb20455cc592a69c080abac770ce90 Le formulaire de demande le plus r\u00e9cent .vbs \\n6c39900d77dcba158e1d27c7619cb06d Outstanding Balance Sheet(A).vbs \\ndad708e050632a4280cabf98ac1376b7 Outstanding Balance Sheet.vbs \\n05d188f071d097f5b6bd8138749b4b14 Penyata bank.vbs \\n2c6f05f1f309d89b2236e6c8b59c88f9 Account Statement\uff0813K\uff09 (2).vbs \\n3b1aba44dd3d9b6339b6f56e2f42034b Statement of Account.txt \\nd43fdaa1f0ee09d7e5f0f94ee9df7b6c Bitte f\u00fcllen Sie das Formular f\u00fcr Umsatzsteuer-Nullsatz-Verk\u00e4ufe aus.vbs \\ndf4fa0369eaca5cec348be293890d4af Account Statement.vbs \\n63ac85195b73753333316a889cf5880f Statement of Account(O).vbs \\n74fd9f91fc93b6288b4fc253ea5b3e20 Sila semak bil anda.vbs \\nd06333c360b51456f427e616c3c5f8bd Sila semak bil anda.vbs \\n993f4c0cadbc769a4b0ed62a918db58d FinancialReportsS.vbs \\n1d94fbe9cab21278cc3f104bea334d08 Promissory_Note(b).vbs \\n9d9ac85765e4a818a3ccabe2cf4fef82 Debt Statement.vbs \\n6fb6a55424adfb61e31f06aef33273e5 dfjieya.vbs \\nf90ed4b2d0b67114aa89ddfed658e5c0 dfjieya.vbs \\n8c3322009b8982663c0cbecd9492e7eb 0lf.vbs \\n66705384a7ad81d14c34fc6c054a0ecf iowepv.vbs \\n8c6d9fc389ad3f20ccbc71d77eb39bfa btksfmsi.vbs \\n1a3cc75466ffb1971482f7abf7aabc3f home3.vbs \\n1c47c63e5ed25060d95359c57c77b107 zipats.vbs \\n31037a42ca048e06e69a78f55bc2eff5 1122.vbs \\n7f16449cd0c4862d1eadf8a5742bf09a payload_1.vbs \\n79ecd61b09b0f2d54b34586c916c4ec9 sac8.vbs \\n7849061c536a3efb05a56d504694e7e7 6oy.vbs \\nddaffe9849f7f3c79f8804adb9a6b3d5 kof.vbs \\nd01cad98dd0d01b75e04e784953c5e2b sleestak_payload_1.vbs\\n\\n### Domains\\n\\ntemu.baskwms[.]top \\ninvoice.msopsa[.]top \\nbaoxis[.]cc \\nsdcwww.oss-ap-southeast-1.aliyuncs[.]com \\nbaoyuw2s.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]com \\nsjdkjj23.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]com \\nxijkwm2.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]com \\nyifubafu.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]com\\n\\n### Attacker-controlled UEMS server IP Address\\n\\n202.61.160[.]202 \\n202.61.160[.]201 \\n202.61.160[.]137 \\n202.61.160[.]160 \\n202.61.160[.]208 \\n38.55.151[.]63″,”published”:”2026-06-22T10:00:38″,”modified”:”2026-06-22T10:00:38″,”type”:”securelist”,”title”:”A VBScript campaign distributed through WhatsApp deploying RMM software”,”source”:””,”references”:””,”id”:”SECURELIST:C973A43958C0478ADD5CD4F16D3BFD4A”,”bulletinFamily”:”blog”,”cwe”:null,”cvelist”:[],”sourceData”:””,”sourceHref”:””,”cvss”:{“score”:0,”severity”:”NONE”,”vector”:”NONE”,”version”:”NONE”},”cvss2″:{},”cvss3″:{“version”:””,”vectorString”:””,”baseScore”:0,”baseSeverity”:””,”attackVector”:””,”attackComplexity”:””,”privilegesRequired”:””,”userInteraction”:””,”scope”:””,”confidentialityImpact”:””,”integrityImpact”:””,”availabilityImpact”:””,”cvssV3″:{“version”:””,”vectorString”:””,”baseScore”:0,”baseSeverity”:””,”attackVector”:””,”attackComplexity”:””,”privilegesRequired”:””,”userInteraction”:””,”scope”:””,”confidentialityImpact”:””,”integrityImpact”:””,”availabilityImpact”:””}},”href”:”https:\/\/securelist.com\/whatsapp-vbs-rmm-campaign\/120290\/”,”category_name”:”News”,”post_link”:””,”product”:””,”version”:””,”vendor”:””,”ai_description”:””,”ai_severity”:””,”ai_vendor”:””,”ai_product”:””,”ai_version”:””,”ai_score”:0}<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
{“lastseen”:”2026-06-22T11:36:50″,”description”:”\\n\\nIn June 2026, we observed a malware campaign distributing malicious VBScript files through direct messages in WhatsApp. The campaign affected users across multiple countries and…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[6,8,12,13,33,136,7,11,5],"class_list":["post-64697","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-category_news","tag-cve","tag-cvss","tag-exploit","tag-news","tag-none","tag-securelist","tag-security","tag-tapic","tag-vulnerability"],"yoast_head":"\n