CVE 9.9 CRITICAL

Roxy-WI: Authenticated RCE on every managed HAProxy load balancer via `option` field config injection in section save_CVE-2026-45558

9.9 / 10
CRITICAL
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Description

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints (POST /api/service/haproxy/<server_id>/section/<section_type> and the PUT / global / defaults variants) accept a JSON option field that is not validated, not escaped, and is rendered verbatim into the generated HAProxy configuration via the section.j2, global.j2, and defaults.j2 Ansible templates. Because Roxy-WI then pushes the generated config to the load balancer and runs systemctl reload haproxy, an authenticated user with role ≤ 3 (user) can inject arbitrary HAProxy directives into the config that runs on every load balancer their group manages — including option external-check + external-check command /bin/bash -c '…', which gives remote code execution on the load balancer as the haproxy user on every health-check tick. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

AI Analysis

Authenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Roxy-WI via config injection in section save

Basic Information

ID CVE-2026-45558
Source GitHub_M
Published Jun 10, 2026 at 14:01

Affected Product

Vendor roxy-wi
Product roxy-wi
Version <= 8.2.6.4
Affected Versions roxy-wi roxy-wi <= 8.2.6.4

CWE Classification

AI Assessment

AI Score 9.9 / 10
AI Severity Critical
Vendor Roxy-WI
Product Roxy-WI
Version <= 8.2.6.4

References

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