9.5
/ 10
CRITICAL
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Description
In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflowβs main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.
AI Analysis
Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment
Basic Information
ID
CVE-2026-47174
Source
GitHub_M
Published
Jun 11, 2026 at 18:46
Affected Product
Vendor
duck-organization
Product
duck-site
Version
< 1.0.1
Affected Versions
duck-organization duck-site < 1.0.1
CWE Classification
AI Assessment
AI Score
9.5 / 10
AI Severity
Critical
Vendor
duck-organization
Product
duck-site
Version
< 1.0.1