CVE 6.5 MEDIUM

Community.general: community.general nexmo — api credentials exposed in get url query string[security] community.general nexmo — api credentials exposed in get url query string_CVE-2026-11820

6.5 / 10
MEDIUM
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Description

Module: plugins/modules/nexmo.py

CVSS 3.1: 6.5 MEDIUM — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Issue: api_key and api_secret are declared no_log=True at the input level, but both credentials are immediately URL-encoded into a GET request as query parameters, bypassing all no_log protection.

Vulnerable Code (lines 82-93):

msg = {
"api_key": module.params.get("api_key"),
"api_secret": module.params.get("api_secret"),
"from": module.params.get("src"),
"text": module.params.get("msg"),
}
url = f"{NEXMO_API}?{urlencode(msg)}"
response, info = fetch_url(module, url, headers=headers)

Observed Output:

https://rest.nexmo.com/sms/json?api_key=a1b2c3d4&api_secret=MyS3cr3tK3y!!&from=AnsibleBot&to=15551234567&text=Hello

Exposure Vectors:

Ansible verbose output (-vvv) logs the full request URL

Vonage/Nexmo server access logs record credentials in query string

HTTP proxies, SIEM, and network inspection tools capture the full URL

AWX/Automation Controller network debug logs

Fix: Switch to POST with credentials in the request body:

data = urlencode({"api_key": api_key, "api_secret": api_secret,
"from": src, "to": number, "text": msg})
fetch_url(module, NEXMO_API, data=data, method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"})

Basic Information

ID CVE-2026-11820
Source redhat
Published Jun 23, 2026 at 19:53

Affected Product

Vendor Red Hat
Product Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10

CWE Classification

References

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