GHSA-HCRC-79HJ-M3QH Wazuh server vulnerable to remote code execution

Vulnerability Details

Basic Information

Title GHSA-HCRC-79HJ-M3QH Wazuh server vulnerable to remote code execution
Type osv
Published 2025-04-22T16:53:39
Last Seen 2025-04-22T19:36:28
CVSS Score 9.9 (CRITICAL)

CVSS v3 Details

Attack Vector NETWORK
Attack Complexity LOW
Privileges Required LOW
User Interaction NONE
Scope CHANGED
Confidentiality Impact LOW
Integrity Impact HIGH
Availability Impact HIGH

CVE Information

CVE IDs CVE-2025-24016
CWE
Bulletin Family software

Description

### Summary
An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows for remote code execution on Wazuh servers.
The vulnerability can be triggered by anybody with API access (compromised dashboard or Wazuh servers in the cluster) or, in certain configurations, even by a compromised agent.

### Details
DistributedAPI parameters are a serialized as JSON and deserialized using `as_wazuh_object` (in `framework/wazuh/core/cluster/common.py`). If an attacker manages to inject an unsanitized dictionary in DAPI request/response, they can forge an unhandled exception (`__unhandled_exc__`) to evaluate arbitrary python code.

Using the server API, it quite easy to trigger. For example, using the `run_as` endpoint (implemented by `run_as_login` in `api/api/controllers/security_controller.py`): the `auth_context` argument is completely controlled by the attacker, and is forwarded to the master server to handle. By sending a malicious `run_as` request to a worker server, it is possible to execute code on the master server.

It is also possible to exploit the bug as a compromised agent, in certain configurations.
A compromised agent can respond to a `getconfig` request with a malicious JSON object (containing a serialized unhandled exception). If the `getconfig` request was caused because of a server API request to `/agents/{agent_id}/config/{component}/{configuration}` (`api.controllers.agent_controller.get_agent_config`), and the agent is managed by a server other than the one that received the server API request, the unsafe deserialization will occur on the server that received the original server API request.

“`
user server A server B agent
| | | |
| -get-config-> | | |
| | –get-config-dapi-> | |
| | | –getconf-> |
| | | <-payload-- | | X <-----payload------ | | | | | | ``` It is likely that there are more ways to reach the unsafe deserialization function (`as_wazuh_object`), some of them might even be accessible from different contexts (without credentials, or initiated by a compromised agent). I suggest fixing the root cause instead of attempting to sanitize inputs that reach it. Note that there are multiple other ways to execute arbitrary code in `as_wazuh_object`, easier by using a `__callable__`, or potentially abusing callable gadgets in `exception`, `wresults` or `Wazuh`. ### PoC To trigger using the server API (assuming default credentials): ```bash curl -X POST -k -u "wazuh-wui:MyS3cr37P450r.*-" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data '{"__unhandled_exc__":{"__class__": "exit", "__args__": []}}' https://:55000/security/user/authenticate/run_as
“`
this will shut down the master server.

### Impact
This is a remote code execution on Wazuh server, affecting the latest version (v4.9.0 at this time)

Impact Assessment

Base Score 9.9
Severity CRITICAL

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